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It is customary for the Interviewer to begin with an introduction describing the
circumstances of the interview and providing an overview of the nature and
importance of the work of the interviewee. However, in this case, as Editor of
this journal, I feel it would be presumptuous of me to provide my own overview
and evaluation of the work of this great man, Paul Samuelson. The scope of his
contributions has been so vast (averaging almost one technical paper per month
for over 50 years) that it could be particularly difﬁcult to identify those areas of
modern economic theory to which he has not made seminal contributions.1 In
addition to his over 550 published papers, his books are legendary. He once said:
“Let those who will—write the nation’s laws—if I can write its textbooks.”
Instead of attempting to provide my own overview, I am limiting this introduc-
tion to the following direct (slightly edited) quotation of a few paragraphs from
the Web site, The History of Economic Thought, which is maintained online by
the New School University in New York2:
Perhaps more than anyone else, Paul A. Samuelson has personiﬁed mainstream economics
in the second half of the twentieth century. The writer of the most successful principles
textbook ever (1948), Paul Samuelson has been not unjustly considered the incarnation
of the economics “establishment”—and as a result, has been both lauded and viliﬁed for
virtually everything right and wrong about it.
Samuelson’s most famous piece of work, Foundations of Economic Analysis (1947), is one
of the grandest tomes that helped revive Neoclassical economics and launched the era of
the mathematization of economics. Samuelson was one of the progenitors of the Paretian
revival in microeconomics and the Neo-Keynesian Synthesis in macroeconomics during
the post-war period.
ThewunderkindoftheHarvardgenerationof1930s,wherehestudiedunderSchumpeterand
Leontief, Samuelson had a prodigious grasp of economic theory, which has since become
legendary. An unconﬁrmed anecdote has it that at the end of Samuelson’s dissertation
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FIGURE 1. Paul A. Samuelson.
defense, Schumpeter turned to Leontief and asked, “Well, Wassily, have we passed?”
Paul Samuelson moved on to M.I.T. where he built one of the century’s most powerful
economics departments around himself. He was soon joined by R.M. Solow, who was to
become Samuelson’s sometime co-writer and partner-in-crime.
Samuelson’s speciﬁc contributions to economics have been far too many to be listed here—
being among the most proliﬁc writers in economics. Samuelson’s signature method ofINTERVIEW WITH PAUL SAMUELSON 521
economic theory, illustrated in his Foundations (1947), seems to follow two rules which
can also be said to characterize much of Neoclassical economics since then: With every
economic problem, (1) reduce the number of variables and keep only a minimum set of
simple economic relations; and (2) if possible, rewrite it as a constrained optimization
problem.
In microeconomics, he is responsible for the theory of revealed preference (1938,
1947). This and his related efforts on the question of utility measurement and integrability
(1937, 1950) opened the way for future developments by Debreu, Georgescu-Roegen,
and Uzawa. He also introduced the use of comparative statics and dynamics through his
“correspondence principle” (1947), which was applied fruitfully in his contributions to
the dynamic stability of general equilibrium (1941, 1944). He also developed what are
now called “Bergson-Samuelson social welfare functions” (1947, 1950, 1956); and, no less
famously, Samuelson is responsible for the harnessing of “public goods” into Neoclassical
theory (1954, 1955, 1958).
Samuelson was also instrumental in establishing the modern theory of production. His
Foundations (1947) are responsible for the envelope theorem and the full characterization
of the cost function. He made important contributions to the theory of technical progress
(1972). His work on the theory of capital is well known, if contentious. He demonstrated
one of the ﬁrst remarkable “Non-Substitution” theorems (1951) and, in his famous paper
with Solow (1953), initiated the analysis of dynamic Leontief systems. This work was
reiterated in his famous 1958 volume on linear programming with Robert Dorfman and
Robert Solow, wherein we also ﬁnd a clear introduction to the “turnpike” conjecture of
linear von Neumann systems. Samuelson was also Joan Robinson’s main adversary in the
Cambridge Capital Controversy—introducing the “surrogate” production function (1962),
and then subsequently (and graciously) relenting (1966).
In international trade theory, he is responsible for the Stolper–Samuelson Theorem and,
independently of Lerner, the Factor Price Equalization theorem (1948, 1949, 1953), as well
as (ﬁnally) resolving the age-old “transfer problem” relating terms of trade and capital
ﬂows, as well as the Marxian transformation problem (1971), and other issues in Classical
economics (1957, 1978).
In macroeconomics, Samuelson’s multiplier-accelerator macrodynamic model (1939) is
justly famous, as is the Solow–Samuelson presentation of the Phillips Curve (1960) to the
world. He is also famous for popularizing, along with Allais, the “overlapping generations”
model which has since found many applications in macroeconomics and monetary theory.
In many ways, his work on speculative prices (1965) effectively anticipates the efﬁcient
markets hypothesis in ﬁnance theory. His work on diversiﬁcation (1967) and the “lifetime
portfolio” (1969) is also well known.
Paul Samuelson’s many contributions to Neoclassical economic theory were recognized
with a Nobel Memorial prize in 1970.
Keywords: Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Trade, Welfare Economics,
Finance Theory, Capital Theory, Revealed Preference, Overlapping
Generations
Barnett: As an overture to this interview, can you give us a telescopic summary
of 1929 to 2003 trends in macroeconomics?
Samuelson: Yes, but with the understanding that my sweeping simpliﬁcations
do need, and can be given, documentation.522 WILLIAM A. BARNETT
As the 1920’s came to an end, the term macroeconomics had no need to be
invented. InAmerica,asinEurope, money andbanking books preached levels and
trends in price levels in terms of the Fisher–Marshall MV =PQ. Additionally,
particularly in America, business-cycles courses eclectically nominated causes
for ﬂuctuations that were as diverse as “sunspots,” “psychological conﬁdence,”
“over- and underinvestment” pathologies, and so forth. In college on the Chicago
Midwayandbefore1935atHarvard,IwasdrilledintheWesleyMitchellstatistical
descriptions and in Gottfried Haberler’s pre-General Theory review of the troops.
ReadthepuerileHarvardbookonTheEconomicsoftheRecoveryProgram,written
by such stars as Schumpeter, Leontief, and Chamberlin, and you will agree with a
reviewer’s headline: Harvard’s ﬁrst team strikes out.
Keynes’s 1936 General Theory—paralleled by such precursors as Kahn,
Kalecki, and J.M. Clark—gradually ﬁlled in the vacuum. Also, pillars of the
MV =PQ paradigm, such as all of Fisher, Wicksell, and Pigou, died better
macroeconomists than they had earlier been—this for varied reasons of economic
history.
Wicksellwasnonplussedintheearly1920’swhenpostwarunemploymentarose
from his nominated policy of returning after 1920 back to pre-1914 currency
parities. His long tolerance for Say’s law and neutrality of money (even during
the 1865–1900 deﬂation) eroded away in his last years. For Fisher, his personal
ﬁnanciallossesinthe1929–1934DepressionmodiﬁedhisbeliefsthatV andQ/V
were quasi constants in the MV =PQtautology. Debt deﬂation all around him
belied that. Pigou, after a hostile 1936 review of The General Theory (occasioned
much by Keynes’s ﬂippancies about Marshall and “the classics”), handsomely
acknowledged wisdoms in The General Theory’s approaches in his 1950 Keynes’s
General Theory: A Retrospective View.
Ibelaborthisancienthistorybecausewhatthosegodsweremodifyingwasmuch
thatMiltonFriedmanwasrenominatingaboutmoneyaround1950inencyclopedia
articles and empirical history. It is paradoxical that a keen intellect jumped on that
old bandwagon just when technical changes in money and money substitutes—
liquidmarketsconnectedbywireandtelephonicliquid“safemoneymarketfunds,”
which paid interest rates on ﬁxed-price liquid balances that varied between 15%
per annum and 1%, depending on price level trends—were realistically replacing
the scalar M by a vector of (M0, M1, M2,...,M17, a myriad of bonds with tight
bid-asked prices,. . . ). We all pity warm-hearted scholars who get stuck on the
wrongpathsofsocialistichope.Thatsamekindofregrettablechoicecharacterizes
anyone who bets doggedly on ESP, or creationism, or ....T h ep ityo fitin c re a se s
for one who adopts a simple theory of positivism that exonerates a nominated
theory, even if its premises are unrealistic, so long only as it seems to describe
with approximate accuracy some facts. Particularly vulnerable is a scholar who
tries to test competing theories by submitting them to simplistic linear regressions
withnosophisticatedcalculationsofGrangercausality,cointegration,colinearities
and ill-conditioning, or a dozen other safeguard econometric methodologies. To
give one speciﬁc example, when Christopher Sims introduces both M and anINTERVIEW WITH PAUL SAMUELSON 523
FIGURE 2. New York, February 19, 1961. Seated left to right, participating guests who
appeared on the ﬁrst of The Great Challenge symposia of 1961: Professor Henry A.
Kissinger,Director of theHarvard International Seminar;Dr. PaulA.Samuelson, Professor
of Economics at MIT and President of the American Economic Association; Professor
Arnold J. Toynbee, world historian; Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, former Chairman of the
Atomic Energy Commission and former Secretary of Commerce; Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations; and Howard K. Smith, CBS news correspondent in
Washington, moderator of the program. The topic: “The World Strategy of the United
States as a Great Power.”
interest rate in a multiple regression testing whether M drives P, Q/V,o rQ
in some systematic manner congenial to making a constant rate of growth of
money supply, M1, an optimal guide for policy, then in varied samples the interest
rate alone works better without M than M works alone or without the interest
rate.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. There was a widespread myth of the
1970’s, a myth along Tom Kuhn’s (1962) Structure of Scientiﬁc Revolutions lines.
The Keynesianism, which worked so well in Camelot and brought forth a long
epoch of price-level stability with good Q growth and nearly full employment,
gave way to a new and quite different macro view after 1966. A new paradigm,
monistic monetarism, so the tale narrates, gave a better ﬁt. And therefore King
Keynes lost self-esteem and public esteem. The King is dead. Long live King
Milton!
Contemplate the true facts. Examine 10 prominent best forecasting models
1950–1980: Wharton, Townsend–Greenspan, Michigan Model, St. Louis Reserve
Bank, Citibank Economic Department under Walter Wriston’s choice of Lief
Olson,etc.WhenaspecialistintheFederalReservesystemgradedmodelsinterms524 WILLIAM A. BARNETT
of their accuracy for out-of-sample future performance for a whole vector of target
macro variables, never did post-1950 monetarism score well! For a few quarters in
theearly1970’s,ShirleyAlmondistributedlags,involving[Mi(−1),Mi(−2),...,
Mi(−n)], wandered into some temporary alignment with reality. But then, outﬁts
like that at Citibank, even when they added on Ptolemaic epicycle to epicycle,
generated monetarism forecasts that diverged systematically from reality. Data
mining by dropping the Mi’s that worked worst still did not attain statistical
signiﬁcance. Overnight, Citibank wiped out its economist section as superﬂuous.
Meantime,insidetheFed,theancientFederalReserveBoard–MIT–Pennmodelof
Modigliani, Ando, et al. kept being tweaked at the Bank of Italy and at home. For
it,M didmatterasforalmosteveryone.ButneverdidM alonemattersystemically,
as post-1950 Friedman monetarism professed.
It was the 1970s’ supply shocks (OPEC oil, worldwide crop failures,...)th a t
worsened forecasts and generated stagﬂation incurable by either ﬁscal or central
bankpolicies.That’swhatunderminedCamelotcockiness—notbettermonetarism
that gave better policy forecasts. No Tom Kuhn case study here at all.
Barnett: Let’s get back to your own post-1936 macro hits and misses, beliefs,
and evolutions.
Samuelson: As in some other answers to this interview’s questions, after a
strugglewithmyselfandwithmy1932–1936macroeducation,Iopportunistically
begantouseTheGeneralTheory’smainparadigms:thefactthatmillionsofpeople
without jobs envied those like themselves who had jobs, while those in jobs felt
sorry for those without them, while all the time being fearful of losing the job they
did have. These I took to be established facts and to serve as effective evidence
that prices were not being unsticky, in the way that an auction market needs
them to be, if full employment clearing were to be assured. Pragmatically and
opportunistically, I accepted this as tolerable “micro foundations” for the new
1936 paradigm.
A later writer, such as Leijonhufvud, I knew to have it wrong, when he later
argued the merits of Keynes’s subtle intuitions and downplayed the various (iden-
tical!) mathematical versions of The General Theory. The so-called 1937 Hicks
or later Hicks–Hansen IS-LM diagram will do as an example for the debate.
Hansen never pretended that it was something original. Actually, one could more
legitimately call it the Harrod–Keynes system. In any case, it was isomorphic with
an early Reddaway set of equations and similar sets independently exposited by
Meade and by Lange. Early on, as a second-year Harvard graduate student, I had
translated Keynes’s own words into the system that Leijonhufvud chose to belittle
as unrepresentative of Keynes’s central message.
Just as Darwinism is not a religion in the sense that Marxism usually is,
my Keynesianism has always been an evolving development, away from the
Neanderthal Model T Keynesianism of liquidity traps and inadequate inclusion of
stocks of wealth and stocks of invested goods, and, as needed, included indepen-
dent variables in the mathematical functions determinative of equilibria and their
trends.INTERVIEW WITH PAUL SAMUELSON 525
By 1939, Tobin’s Harvard Honors thesis had properly added Wealth to the Con-
sumption Function. Modigliani’s brilliant 1944 piece improved on 1936 Keynes.
Increasingly, we American Keynesians in the Hansen School—Tobin, Metzler,
S a m u e lso n ,M o d ig lia n i,S o lo w ,...,— became impatient with the foot-dragging
English—such as Kahn and Robinson—whose lack of wisdoms became manifest
in the 1959 Radcliffe Committee Report. The 1931 Kahn that I admired was not
the later Kahn, who would assert that the MV =PQdeﬁnition contained bogus
variables. Indeed, had Friedman explicitly played up, instead of playing down, the
keyfactthatarashReaganﬁscaldeﬁcitcouldraiseV systematicallybyitsinducing
higher interest rates, Friedman’s would have been less of an eccentric macro
model.
I would guess that most MIT Ph.D.’s since 1980 might deem themselves not to
be“Keynesians.”Butthey,andmoderneconomistseverywhere,dousemodelslike
those of Samuelson, Modigliani, Solow, and Tobin. Professor Martin Feldstein,
my Harvard neighbor, complained at the 350th Anniversary of Harvard that
Keynesians had tried to poison his sophomore mind against saving. Tobin and
I on the same panel took this amiss, since both of us since 1955 had been favoring
a “neoclassical synthesis,” in which full employment with an austere ﬁscal bud-
get would add to capital formation in preparation for a coming demographic
turnaround. I ﬁnd in Feldstein’s macro columns much the same paradigms that
my kind of Keynesians use today.
On the other hand, within any “school,” schisms do tend to arise. Tobins
and Modiglianis never approved of Robert Eisner or Sidney Weintraub as
FIGURE 3. Left to right in back: James Tobin and Franco Modiqliani. Left to right in front:
Milton Friedman and Paul A. Samuelson. All four are Nobel Laureates in Economics.526 WILLIAM A. BARNETT
“neo-Keynesians,” who denied that lowering of real interest rates might augment
capitalformationattheexpenseofcurrentconsumption.NordoIregardasoptimal
Lerner’s Functional Finance that would sanction any sized ﬁscal deﬁcit so long as
it did not generate inﬂation.
In 1990, I thought it unlikely ever again to encounter in the real world liquidity
traps, or that Paradox of Thrift, which so realistically did apply in the Great
Depressionandwhichalsodidhelpshapeourpay-as-you-gononactuarialfunding
of our New Deal social security system. In economics what goes around may well
come around. During the past 13 years, Japan has tasted a liquidity trap. When
2003 U.S. Fed rates are down to 1%, that’s a lot closer to 0% than it is to a more
“normal” real interest rate of 4% or 5%. Both in micro- and macroeconomics,
master economists know they must face up to nonstationary time series and the
difﬁculties these confront us with.
If time permits, I’ll discuss later my qualiﬁed view about “rational expecta-
tions” and about “the New Classicism of Say’s law” and neutrality of money in
effectuating systemic real-variable changes.
Barnett: What is your take on Friedman’s controversial view that his 1950
monetarism was an outgrowth of a forgotten subtle “oral tradition” at Chicago?
Samuelson: Brieﬂy, I was there, knew all the players well, and kept class notes.
And beyond Fisher–Marshall MV =PQ, there was little else in Cook County
macro.
A related and somewhat contradictory allegation by David Laidler proclaimed
that Ralph Hawtrey—through Harvard channels of Allyn Young, Lauchlin Currie,
and John H. Williams—had an important (long-neglected) inﬂuence on Chicago’s
macro paradigms of that same 1930–1936 period. Again, my informed view is
in the negative. A majority of the Big Ten courses did cite Hawtrey, but in no
depth.
BeforecomparingviewswithmeonFriedman’sdisputedtopic(andafterhaving
done so), Don Patinkin denied that in his Chicago period of the 1940’s any
trace of such a speciﬁed oral tradition could be found in his class notes (on
Mints, Knight, Viner), or could be found in his distinct memory. My Chicago
years predated Friedman’s autumn 1932 arrival and postdated his departure for
Columbia and the government’s survey of incomes and expenditures. I took all the
macroeconomic courses on offer by Chicago teachers: Mints, Simons, Director,
and Douglas. Also in that period, I attended lectures and discussions on the
GreatDepression,involvingKnight,Viner,Yntema,Mints,andGideonse.Nothing
beyond the sophisticated account by Dennis Robertson, in his famous Cambridge
Handbook on Money, of the Fisher–Marshall–Pigou MV =PQparadigm can be




publications have ever been cited, I believe that this nominated myth should not be
elevated to the rank of plausible history of ideas. Taylor Ostrander, then unknownINTERVIEW WITH PAUL SAMUELSON 527
to me, did graduate work on the Midway in my time and has kept copious notes. I
have asked him and Warren Samuels to comb this important database to conﬁrm
or deny these strong contentions of mine.
Having killed off one 1930s’ Chicago myth, I do need to report on another
too-little-noticed genuine macro oral tradition from the mid-1930’s Chicago. It is
not at all conﬁrmatory of the Friedman hypothesis, and is indeed 180◦ opposed to
that in its eclectic doubts about simplistic monetarism. Nor can I cogently connect
it with a Young–Hawtrey inﬂuence.
You didnot have tobea wunderkind tonotice intheearly 1930’s that traditional
orthodox notions about Say’s law and neutral money were sterile in casting light
on contemporary U.S. and global slumps. Intelligently creative scholars such as
SimonsandVinerhadbythemid-1930’slearnedsomethingfromcurrenteconomic
history about inadequacies of the simple MV =PQparadigm and its “M alone
drives PQ” nonsequitur.
Keynes, of course, in shedding the skin of the author of the Treatise, accom-
plished a virtual revolution by his liquidity preference paradigm, which realisti-
cally recognized the systematic variabilities in V. Pigou, when recanting in 1950
from his earlier bitter 1936 review of The General Theory, in effect abandoned
what was to become 1950-like monistic Friedmanisms.
HenrySimons,tohiscredit,alreadyinmypre-1935undergraduatedays,sensed
the “liquidity trap” phenomenon. I was impressed by his reasonable dictum:
When open-market operations add to the money supply and at the same time
subtract equivalently from outstanding quasi-zero-yielding Treasury bills that are
strong money substitutes, little increase can be expected as far as spending and
employment are concerned. Note that this was some years before the 1938 period,
when Treasury bills came to have only a derisory yield (sometimes negative).
Experts, but too few policymakers, were impressed by some famous Viner and
Hardy researches for the 1935 Chicago Federal Reserve Bank. These authors
interpreted experience of borrowers who could not ﬁnd lenders as a sign that
during (what we subsequently came to call) “liquidity trap times” money is tight
rather than loose: Safe Treasury bills are cheap as dirt just because effective
tightness of credit chokes off business activity and thereby lowers the market-
clearing short interest rate down toward the zero level. Hoarding of money, which
entailed slowing down of depression V, is then not a psychological aberration;
rather, it is a cool and sensible adjustment to a world where potential plenty is
aborted by failures in both investment and consumer spending out of expectable
incomes (multiplier and accelerator, rigidity of prices and wages, etc.).
Go back now to read Friedman’s article for the 1950 International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences, where as an extremist he plays down (outside of
hyperinﬂation)theeffectsofi (theinterestrate)andﬁscaldeﬁcitsonV,toconﬁrm
that this Simons–Viner–Hardy Chicago oral tradition is not at all the one he has
for a long time claimed to be the early Chicago tradition. (In his defense, I ought
to mention that Friedman had left Chicago for Columbia by the time of the
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favor of expanded deﬁcit ﬁscal spending was itself a recognition of the lim-
ited potency of ∂(PQ)/∂M. In terms of latter-day logic, a consistent Friedman
groupie ought to have refused to sign that 1932 Chicago proclamation. Meantime,
inLondon,Hayek’s1931PricesandProductionhadconvertedtheusuallysensible
Lionel Robbins into the eccentric belief that anything that expanded MV or PQ
would only make the Depression worse!
Barnett: You ﬁrst surfaced as a comer at the University of Chicago. What is
your ﬁnal take on your Midway days?
Samuelson: I was reborn when at age 16 on January 2, 1932, 8:30 a.m., I
walked into a Midway lecture hall to be told about Malthusian population. At the
zenith of Hutchins’s New Chicago Plan, I got a great education in width: physical,
biological, and social sciences topped off by humanities.
January 2, 1932, was an auspicious time to begin economic study for two
unrelated reasons. The Great Depression was then at its nadir—which attracted
good minds into economics and which presented exciting puzzles needing new
solutions.TheChicagoMidwaywasaleadingcenter(maybetheleadingcenter)for
neoclassical economics, and I found exciting Frank Knight, Henry Simons, Jacob
Viner,andPaulDouglas.Myveryﬁrstteacher,AaronDirector(nowaround100),I
likedasaniconoclasticteacher. Hewastheonlymanalivewhocould(later)speak
of “my radical brother-in-law Milton Friedman.” Long without Chicago tenure,
his bibliography was epsilon. But without any database, he was a primary creator
both of the second Chicago School—of Friedman, Stigler, Becker after Knight,
Viner, Douglas, Schultz, Nef, and Simons—and present-day antitrust inactivism.
FIGURE4.Lefttoright,atUniversityofChicagoCentennial,1991:RoseDirectorFriedman,
Milton Friedman, Paul A. Samuelson, and George Stigler.INTERVIEW WITH PAUL SAMUELSON 529
Whatincredibleluck,whilestilladolescent,tostumbleontothesubjectthatwas
of perfect interest to me and for which I had special aptitudes! What work I have
done has been for me more like play. And always I have been overpaid to do it.
Director’s published works are nearly nil, but his was later a major inﬂuence on
(or against?) antitrust policy, and his stubborn iconoclasm had a signiﬁcant role in
creatingtheSecond ChicagoSchool ofFriedman, Stigler,Coase, andBecker. (See
the Stigler autobiography.) Since I entered college before graduating from high
school, I missed the 1931 autumn quarter during which the Social Science Survey
1 curriculum surveyed economics popularly. As a makeshift, I was put into an old-
fashioned, beginners’ course that was being phased out. Slichter’s Modern Eco-
nomicSocietywasDirector’sassignedtext,eventhoughhedidnotspeakwellofit.
(Thefollowingquarter,LloydMintscarriedonwithRichardEly’sbest-sellingOut-
line of Economics, with micro theory largely by Allyn Young.) Director’s best gift
tomewashisunorthodoxassignmentofGustavCassel’sTheoryofSocialEconomy
chapter on “the arithmetic of pricing,” as stolen by Cassel from Walras. Few knew
inthoseModelTdaysaboutthemathematicsofgeneralequilibriumineconomics.
But it was Henry Simons, Frank Knight, and Jacob Viner who most inﬂuenced
my mind. I may have taken more different economics courses at Chicago than
anyone before 1935. Certainly, I was overprepared when entering the Harvard
Graduate School in 1935. I also carried the baggage of excessive admiration of
Frank Knight until time eroded that away.
The best that Knight told us in those days was that in rare depression times,
inexplicably Say’s law and market clearing somehow didn’t obtain temporarily.
Mostofthetime,normalcywouldserendipitouslyreturnandmaybethenwecould
live happily ever after. Maybe. Meantime the only present choice was between
communism and fascism. And for himself, Knight would not choose the latter.
Later, understandably, he recovered from that failure of nerve and reneged on his
circulated text. Somewhere in my ﬁles will be found a copy of his doomsday text.
Thisexplainsthesecondreasonwhy1932wasagreattimeforaneagerteenager
toentereconomicstudy.Oursubjecthadmyriadsofchallengingopenproblems—
problems that mathematical techniques could throw light on, and also close out.
I once described this as being like ﬁshing in a virgin Canadian lake. You threw
in your hook and out came theorem after theorem. Viner is a useful example.
He was a great economist, and perhaps the most learned one on the 1931 globe.
He was also a subtle theorist. With suitable training at McGill and Harvard,
Viner could have been a leading mathematical economist. However, Stephen
Leacock and Frank Taussig taught him no mathematics at all. This made him
fearful of acne-age students like me and our generations who seemed to provide
him with painful competition. (To do Viner justice, let me state that the 1930s’
graphics of trade theory by Lerner, Leontief, me, and Meade was in its essence
already in a 1931 LSE Viner lecture, that the young Lerner would probably have
attended.)
I carried a stout staff in the ﬁght to lift the level of mathematical techniques dur-
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foranyoneindispensablegeniustoarrive.Othersinplentywouldhavecomealong,
trained by Hotellings, Evanses, and Frisches to accomplish that overdue task.
Although I’ve had an acquaintanceship with scores of leading world mathe-
maticians and physicists, I’ve been surprised at how little help I’ve been able to
garner from presenting orally some unsolved puzzles to them. I should not have
been surprised. It is not that a Birkhoff, or Quine, or Ulam, or Levinson, or Kac, or
Gleason was incapable of clearing up my open questions. Rather, it is the case that
a busy mathematician has no motivation to waste his (or her) time getting intu-
itively briefed on someone else’s models in the idiosyncratic ﬁeld of mathematical
economics. Fortunately, access tothegoodHarvardandMITlibrariesenabled one
to ferret out needed book expositions. And it was my good luck that Harvard’s
E.B. Wilson, only proteg´ e of thermodynamicist Willard Gibbs, provided essential
hints that helped in the development of revealed preference and the anticipation
of the inequalities techniques in post-1945 economics programming.
Barnett: For some months in 1936 at Harvard, legend reports, you resisted
conversion to Keynes’s General Theory. Any truth in that?
Samuelson: After 1936 February, when copies of The General Theory arri-
ved in Cambridge, I did struggle with my own initial criticisms of the book; and
I suspect my begrudging acceptance of the Keynesian revolution in paradigm
was importantly the result of Henry Simon’s remark about short-term bonds as a
substitute for M, when the interest rates are low. I was inﬂuenced by that, plus
my earlier recognition that prices and price levels are sticky, and therefore neutral
money and Say’s law lose realism. I knew 100 people without jobs in 1931–1934
and 100 with jobs. The groups would never voluntarily change places: the latter
felt very lucky. The former, about equal in ability, felt unlucky. That’s not what
happens when auction markets equate supply and demand.
Timing is everything. My Society of Fellows 1937–1940 prewar leisure en-
abled the publication in 1948 of Foundations of Economic Analysis. Groups of
youngsters all over the world joined to master its fundamentals. Not until 1983
did I prepare an enlarged edition with terse exposition of post-1947 developments.
Why did this better book sell so poorly in comparison with its predecessor? It was
because practitioners everywhere had become so much more sophisticated by the
end of the century. Schumpeter would say: Monopoly proﬁts are bound to erode
away, as knowledge spreads, which is a good thing.
Barnett: So why did you leave Chicago for Harvard?
Samuelson: Given my volition, I would never have left Chicago, but a new
SocialScienceResearchCouncilFellowship,awardedtotheeightmostpromising
economicsgraduates,bribedmetogotoadifferentuniversity.Theeffectivechoice
was between Harvard and Columbia. Without exception, my Chicago mentors
advised Columbia. By miscalculation, I opted for Harvard, not even knowing
that it was about to move out of lean seasons, thanks primarily to the European
immigrants Schumpeter, Leontief, Haberler, and also later Alvin Hansen.
Three years later, at Harvard, I did thank providence for my hegira away from
the Midway—where I would have missed out on three great twentieth centuryINTERVIEW WITH PAUL SAMUELSON 531
revolutions in economics: the mathematics revolution, the imperfect competition
revolution, and the Keynesian effective-demand revolution. I deplore adversary
proceduresinthehealthyevolutionofascientiﬁcdiscipline.Remainingatdogmat-
ically conservative Chicago or accepting its lucrative 1947 professorship would
have made me more radical than I wanted to be. For my temperament, serenity
wouldbemuchmorefruitfulthanthestimulusofpolemicaldebate.Ispeakonlyfor
myself.
Barnett: Franco Modigliani, in his interview in Macroeconomic Dynamics
(vol. 4, June 2000), stated that he was discouraged from pursuing an offer early
in his career from Harvard University by its Economics Department chair, whom
Modigliani characterized as anti-Semitic and xenophobic. When you acquired
your Ph.D. from Harvard as an A+ student, having produced one of the most
extraordinary dissertations of all times, you were offered a position by MIT, but
not by Harvard. Do you believe that the prejudices of the Harvard department
chair at that time had a role in Harvard’s enormous mistake in that regard? If not,
why did they fail to hire you immediately upon receipt of your Ph.D.?
Samuelson: Anti-Semitism was omni-present in pre-World War II academic
life, here and abroad. So, of course, my WASP wife and I knew that would be a
relevantfactorinmycareeratHarvard.Butby1940,timeswerechanging.Perhaps
I had too much of William Tell’s hauteur in my personality to ingratiate myself
with the circles who gave limited weight to merit in according tenure. When MIT
made a good offer, we thought this could test whether there was great enthusiasm
for my staying at Harvard. When Harvard’s revealed preference consisted of no
majority insistence that I stay, we moved three miles down the Charles River.
(My Mark Perlman Festschrift piece provides a memoir of an earlier “politically
incorrect” age.)
In retrospect, that was the luckiest decision I ever made. In less than a decade,
postwar MIT developed into a powerhouse in frontier economics. The Ivy League
snared future Rhodes scholars. Our magnet attracted most of the NSF Fellows in
economics.
Barnett: Tell us about Harvard in the 1930’s.
Samuelson: Hitler (and Lenin) did much for American science. Leontief,
Schumpeter, and Haberler brought Harvard to life after a lean period. Alvin
Hansen was for me an important inﬂuence. Outside of economics, both in the
physical sciences and the medical-biological sciences, the U.S. dominates. Ac-
tually, toward the end of World War II, when victory was no longer in doubt, I
was lent by the Radiation Laboratory to help the Vanevar Bush Secretariat draft
Science, the Endless Frontier. Biochemist John Edsall (Harvard), Robert Morison
(physiologist at the Rockefeller Foundation), and I did a lot of the drafting—
of course under the instruction of I.I. Rabi, Edwin Land, Olivier Buckley (head
of Bell Lab), and other members of Bush’s appointed committee. Against some
resistance, what emerged was beyond my fondest hopes: an NSF (inclusive of the
Social Sciences), vastly expanded NIH, rather than a nominated plan to give every
U.S. county its population quota of dollar subsidies for research.532 WILLIAM A. BARNETT
Barnett: As you have mentioned, Hitler was responsible for an extraordinary
migration of many of Europe’s greatest economists to the United States, including
Koopmans, Leontief, Schumpeter, Marschak, Haberler, and Kuznets, along with
most of the Austrian School of Economics. They in turn helped to attract to
this country other major European economists, such as Hurwicz, Debreu, Theil,
Bhagwati, Coase, and Fischer. But it is widely believed in much of the world that
the United States no longer has the clear political advantage for scholars over
Europe that existed at that time, and in fact there is now an increase in the number
of American students deciding to study in Canada. Is America in danger of losing
its intellectual comparative advantages for economists to other countries?
Samuelson: I do not discern any trend toward foreign out-competition of U.S.
science. Sole reason: our predominant real GDP, and the brain drain to us it has
induced.
Barnett: Your research from the beginning has shown exceptional inﬂuence
from the physical sciences, and you mention the work of physical scientists ex-
tensively throughout your research, as you did in your famous Foundations.H o w
did you become so heavily inﬂuenced by physical scientists? Did you study their
work at some point in your education?
Samuelson: I would be rash to ignore analytical sciences outside of the social
sciences. But I would be stupid, if out of “physics envy” or snakeoil salesmanship,
I would inject into economic theory analytical mathematics that ﬁt only gases and
liquids. In my writings, I have criticized wrong analogies to physics by Irving
Fisher (whom I admire as a superlative American theorist). Even the genius of
von Neumann has not escaped my critical auditings. I have given only qualiﬁed
approval to Marshall’s hope for a more biological and less physical approach
to future economics. But that has not aborted my writings in demographical
genetics,notallunqualiﬁablyadmiringofR.A.Fisher’sgeneticalwritings.Maybe
someday, future Philip Morowskis or Roy Weintraubs will better ﬁne-tune their
nuances.
Barnett:Throughout your career,youhave tendedtohave your“ﬁnger inevery
pie” within the ﬁeld of economics. But at the present time, it is difﬁcult to think
of any economists who are “generalists” in such a total sense. To be inﬂuencial in
any area of economics requires a degree of specialization that virtually rules out
broad inﬂuence throughout the ﬁeld. Is that because of the dramatic expansion of
the ﬁeld and its growth in both breadth and depth, or is it because we don’t yet
have another young Samuelson on the scene?
Samuelson: If only because of the explosion of total numbers of academic
and nonacademic economists, no young Samuelson today could hope to be the
kind of generalist that I used to be. Remember I got a young start. I was a fast
and voracious reader who turned the pages of all the newly current exchange
journals at Harvard’s Quarterly Journal of Economics ofﬁce. The micro tools that
worked in general theory also worked in trade theory. With some help from me,
post-Keynesian macroeconomics lent itself to complete general equilibrium tech-
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was a passion with me, the banal statistics taught at Harvard naturally spurred me
on to Fisher, Neyman–Pearson, and Wald–Savage further developments.
Having a facile pen helped. Before MIT Chairman Ralph Freeman drafted me
to author an elementary text, I wrote for New Republic and other publications.
Hansen brought me into Washington New Deal circles.
Barnett:Theeconomicsprofessionwidelywasinerrorabouttheconsequences
oftheSecondWorldWar.Itiswellknownthatalargepercentageoftheeconomics
profession, including you in an article in the New Republic, expected an economic
collapse at the end of the war. There were a few exceptions, such as Alvin Hansen
andSumnerSlichter.Whydidsomanyeconomistsexpecttheeconomytoperform
badly at the end of the war? In retrospect, it is difﬁcult to understand why that
would have been believed, especially in the United States.
Samuelson: Often I’ve stated how I hate to be wrong. That has aborted many
a tempting error, but not all of them. But I hate much more to stay wrong. Early
on, I’ve learned to check back on earlier proclamations. One can learn much from
one’s own errors and precious little from one’s triumphs. By September of 1945, it
was becoming obvious that oversaving was not going to cause a deep and lasting
postwar recession. So then and there, I cut my losses on that bad earlier estimate.
AlthoughHansenwaswiseenoughtoexpectapostwarrestockingboom,itwashis
and Keynes’s teachings about declining investment opportunities that predisposed
my activist contemporaries to fear a post-peace depression. Aside from Hansen
and Slichter, Willy Fellner and W.W. Woytinski taped things right: Accumulated
saving from the way we ﬁnanced the war and rationed resources, plus lust for
long-delayed comforts and luxuries, were the gasoline that shifted resources from
war to full-employment peacetime uses. I knew that argument but did not know
what weight to give to it. (Scores of older economists were optimists about 1946
full employment. But if their only support for this view was a dogmatic belief in
Say’s law, they [Knight is an example] carried little weight with me.)
Mention should be made of another mid-1940’s Samuelson error. I judged that
the market-clearing real interest rate level would be 3% or less. That big mistake
of course correlated with the earlier unemployment error. I was too stubbornly
slow in cutting my losses on that hunch.
Barnett: You were an important Advisor to President John Kennedy. To this
day,politiciansofbothmajorpoliticalpartiestendtopointtoKennedy’seconomic
policy for support of their agendas. To what degree were those policies inﬂuenced
by you, and who else played a role in those economic policies?
Samuelson: With great reluctance, I let Senator John F. Kennedy recruit me
to his think tank. From nomination date to inaugural day I became his chief
economic advisor. Our styles and chemistries clicked. I’ve never regretted staying
out of Washington for two reasons: (1) Research is my true love. (2) The CEA
team of Heller, Tobin, and Gordon was the greatest ever. (I did help pick them.)
Only when they needed my extra heavy lifting from Cambridge, did I weigh in.
Barnett: How did you become a mathematical economist? Legends proliferate
that you began in physics, or mathematics, and then levitated down to economics.534 WILLIAM A. BARNETT
Samuelson: The truth is that, although I did have aptitude for school math, it
was only early in my economic studies that I realized how useful more, and still
more, math would be for the puzzles my generation would have to face.
Beulah Shoesmith, spinster, was a famous mathematics teacher at Hyde Park
High School near the University of Chicago. A number of scientists came from
her workshop. Two of the eight recipients of the 1996 Medal of Science had
been her pupils, as were Roy Radner and my brother Bob Summers. I took the
many courses offered: advanced algebra, solid geometry, and (boring, surveyor-
like) trigonometry. However, in the old-fashioned curriculum, neither calculus nor
analytic geometry was considered to be a precollege subject—a terrible mistake.
So, after my freshman college year, I hurried to make up for lost time.





elite, I discovered matrix multiplication before I knew about matrices—Markov,
Frobenius, or Minkowski. I took or audited, at Chicago or Harvard, useful courses
from Barnard, Graves, George Birkhoff, Hassler Whitney, Marshall Stone, and es-
pecially Edwin Bidwell Wilson. E.B. had been the only proteg´ e at Yale of Willard
Gibbs. Since I was Wilson’s main proteg´ e, that makes me kind of a grandson to
Gibbs.
Fortunately, I was enough ahead of my contemporaries in economics that I had
all the time in the world to spend in the library stacks on mathematics. Never did I
reachalimittousefulnessofmoreelaboratemathematics.Myeconomicproblems
dictated where my math preoccupations should go—not vice versa. Of course,
it was Edgeworth, Walras, Pareto, Gibbs, E.B. Wilson, Grifﬁth Evans, Frank
Ramsey, Bowley, R.D.G. Allen, Hicks, Frisch, Lotka, Leontief, and von Neumann
who were my masters. I’m afraid that I was a captious pupil, often stubbornly
critical of my betters. (Example: von Neumann’s foundations for cardinal utility
instochasticLaplacianchoicebeggedtheissueoftheRamsey–Marschak–Savage–
Debreu independence axiom by burying that in his zeroth axiom. Worse, he
stubbornly ignored all of his critics.)
At Harvard (1935–1940), economists learned little statistics, except in E.B.
Wilson’s small seminar. Outside Schultz’s specialized graduate course, the
Chicago economics curriculum had been little better. In the early 1930’s, I had
to read, on my own, Thurstone’s little potboiler to learn about the rudiments of
statistics. Only at Columbia was Hotelling teaching 1920–1930 R.A. Fisher. Of
course, all this changed rapidly once Wald, Feller, Tukey, and Savage entered the
scene.
Barnett: How can we relate your Stolper–Samuelson work, and your later
Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelsonresearchtothepresentrevoltsagainstglobalization?
Can this trend among some of the world’s youth be viewed as opposition by the
political left to the implications of your work on trade?INTERVIEW WITH PAUL SAMUELSON 535
FIGURE 5. Paul Samuelson with Bill Clinton in White House.536 WILLIAM A. BARNETT
FIGURE 6. Paul Samuelson (front left) with Jerome Friedman (Nobel Prize in Physics),
Theodore Schultz (Nobel Prize in Economics), James Watson (Nobel Prize in Biology),
and George Stigler (Nobel Prize in Economics) at University of Chicago Centennial, 1991.
Samuelson: Trade is conﬁrmed to be a substitute for massive immigration
from poor to rich countries. U.S. labor has lost its old monopoly on American
advanced know-how and capital. U.S. total real GDP has net gained (1950–2003)
from foreign export-led growth in Paciﬁc Asia and the EU. However, free trade
can also systematically affect U.S. wages/GDP share and overall inequality. My
little Nobel Lecture (“International Trade for a Rich Country,” lecture before
the Swedish-American Chamber of Commerce, New York City, May 10, 1972:
Stockholm: Federation of Swedish Industries pamphlet, 1972) pointed out that a
rich place can lose net when a poor one newly gains comparative advantage in
activities in which previously the rich county had enjoyed comparative advantage.
Free trade need not help everybody everywhere.
Barnett: Do you have views and reactions to the “rational expectations”
approach and real-business-cycle theory? In his dialogue with Robert Shiller in
Macroeconomic Dynamics (vol. 3, March 1999), Tobin stated that real-business-
cycletheoryis“theenemy.”Incontrast,asisseeninmuchofthepublishedresearch
appearing in this journal, the use of rational expectations theory (sometimes
weakened to include learning) and stochastic dynamic general equilibrium theory
is common within the profession among macroeconomists of many political
views.
Samuelson: Yes, but a lot of different things are loosely related to the words
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doctrine,” which alleges in effect that Say’s law does obtain even in the short
run. I do happen to believe that the U.S. economy (1980–2003) behaves nearer to
Say’s law’s quasi full-employment than did the 1929–1960 U.S. economy, or than
does say the modern French and German economies. But this belief of mine does
not necessarily require a new Lucas–Sargent methodology. Sufﬁcient for it is two
things:
(1) The new 1950–2003 freer global trade has effectively intensiﬁed competition
with U.S. labor from newly trainable, low-wage Paciﬁc Rim labor—competition
strong enough effectively to emasculate the powers of American trade unions (ex-
cept in public service and some untradeable goods industries). Nowadays every
short-term victory by a union only speeds up the day that its industry moves
abroad.
(2) Therehasbeena1980–2003swingtotherightamongvoters,whoseswingawayfrom
“altruism” is somewhat proportional to the time elapsed since the Great Depression
and since the U.S. government’s effective organization for World War II’s “good”
war. As a result, trade unions no longer beneﬁt from government’s help.
A “cowed” labor force runs scared under the newly evolved form of ruthless
corporate governance. In contrast to Japan, when a U.S. CEO ﬁres redundant
workers quickly, Wall Street bids up the price of the ﬁrm’s shares.
Another weak form of “rational expectations” I agree with. “Fool me once.
Shame on you. Fool me twice. Shame on me.” Economic historian Earl
Hamilton used to agree with the view that, when New World gold raised 1500–
1900 price levels, nominal wages tended systematically to lag behind. Kessel
and Alchian had a point in suspecting that people would at least in part learn to
anticipate what has long been going on. I concur to a considerable but limited
degree.
Somerationalexpectationistsovershoot,inmyjudgment,whentheyexaggerate
the “neutrality of money” and the “impotence of government to alter real vari-
ables.” Friedman’s overly simple monetarism ` a la 1950, was criticized from his
left for its gross empirical errors. What must have cut him more personally would
come from any Lucas follower who accused Friedman of fallaciously predicting
that mismanagement of M in MV =PQwas capable of deep real damage rather
than of mere nominal price-level gyration.
Modern statistical methodology, I think, beneﬁts much from Lucas, Sargent,
Hansen, Brock, Prescott, Sims, Granger, Engle, and Stock-Watson explorations
and innovations. But still much more needs to be analyzed. Strangely, theory-
free vectoral autoregressions do almost as well. Also, variables that pass Granger
causality tests can seem to perform as badly in future samples as those that fail
Granger tests. And, still the nonstationaryness of economic history confounds
actual behavior and necessarily weakens our conﬁdence in inferences from past
samples.
Thisdoesnotleadmetonihilism;buthopefully,onlytorealism,and, ` alaOli v er
Twist, to urge for more research.538 WILLIAM A. BARNETT
At many a Federal Reserve meeting with academic consultants, there used to
be about one rational expectationist. So unuseful seemed their contributions and
judgments that the next meeting entailed a new rational expectationist. And each
year’s mail would bring to my desk a few dozen yellow-jacket manuscripts from
the National Bureau, purporting to test some version of rational expectationism.
Manywerenominatedfortesting;fewpassedwithﬂyingcolorstheproposedtests.
I continue to live in both hope and doubt.
In some quarters, it is a popular belief that macroeconomics is less scientiﬁc
than micro and less to be admired. That is not my view. I think macroeconomics
is very challenging, and at this stage of the game it calls for wiser judgments.
A lively science thrives on challenges, and that is why I transfer a good deal
of my time and energy from micro to macro research. Probably as a syndicated
columnist, I have published at monthly intervals a couple of thousand different
journalistic articles. Maybe more. My aim is not to be interesting but rather, as
best as I can, not to be wrong. When my conjecture is still a conjecture, I try to
mark it as such. My notion of a fruitful economic science would be that it can
help us explain and understand the course of actual economic history. A scholar
who seriously addresses commentary on contemporary monthly and yearly events
is, in this view, practicing the study of history—history in its most contemporary
time phasing.
NOTES
1. Perhaps those rare exceptions might include game theoretic and topological models and maybe
the recent literatures on complex unstable nonlinear dynamics, sunspots, and incomplete markets.
But I would not be surprised, if he were to correct those speculations as misperceptions, if I were to
ask.
2. The current URL of that Web site is http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/home.htm.
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